BREAKING ❗️ : Elmina crash: No evidence of incapacitation or physiological factors that affected the flight crew performance – AAIB preliminary reports
❗️ Elmina plane crash: The accident not survivable due to the magnitude of the deceleration force and the post-crash fire -… pic.twitter.com/99UjLIUagX
Elmina air crash preliminary report by AAIB Malaysia. This report is to find out what caused the crash, not to assign blame. pic.twitter.com/ALomAnEDOo
Police say #PN's Badrul Hisham Shaharin @ Chegubard arrested over TikTok videos, not #‘SaveMalaysia’ rally
Police say several reports were lodged against him over TikTok videos in which he allegedly accused PM of selling out country’s sovereignty.https://t.co/HfG6fT0HEv
Tangkapan terhadap Badrul Hisham Shaharin / CheGuBard dibuat di Jalan Raja Laut bertindak atas waran tangkap Mahkamah Majistret Kuala Lumpur ekoran daripada keengganan beliau memberi kerjasama kepada penyiasatan pihak polis setelah arahan menghadiri penyiasatan di bawah seksyen… https://t.co/02Y5Zrv0Pl
More Chinese agencies and state-backed companies across the country have asked their staff to not bring Apple iPhones and other foreign devices to work.https://t.co/aypS4TUHYB
WSJ: China ordered officials at central government agencies not to use Apple’s iPhones and other foreign-branded devices for work or bring them into the office. The report added that the orders were made by “superiors”.
Hard policy decisions denied, but a cultural shift away from Apple could be in the cards.
The Chinese government has clarified media reports that iPhone sales would be banned from use in government administration services. At a press conference this Wednesday, a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry, Mao Ning, explained that as it stands, “China did not issue any law, regulation or policy document that bans the purchase and use of cellphones of foreign brands, such as iPhone.”
But then, the original question wasn’t around a hard ban on Apple products; the original report (courtesy of Wall Street Journal) referred to a soft ban on any Apple technology used at the government level. As that publication wrote, “China ordered officials at central government agencies not to use Apple’s iPhones and other foreign-branded devices for work or bring them into the office.” The report added that the orders were made by “superiors.”
A decision like this doesn’t quite have the same potency as an outright sale and usage ban (in line with the U.S. and Portugal’s ban of Huawei 5G equipment from existing and future infrastructure), but they work the same way.
Yet the devil is usually in the details (especially regarding policy decisions and official communications). Specifically, Mao Ning added that while no laws had been passed banning iPhone sales, the country’s concerns with security and information security (both real-world and cyber) are paramount to the government’s decision. The spokesperson then added, “However, recently, we did notice media reports about security issues related to iPhone.” She added, “The Chinese government attaches great importance to cyber and information security and treats Chinese and foreign companies as equals. We hope all cellphone companies operating in China will strictly abide by China’s laws and regulations.” .
However, the U.S. (and Apple) would have trouble offloading their tech if (or maybe when) the Chinese market rejects some of its most significant efforts – whether through law or culture. It also pays to remember that the spokesperson’s remarks around potential cybersecurity concerns open the window to a more hardline approach to Apple products within the government.
Foreign Ministry: China has no law and regulations prohibiting the purchase and use of foreign brands of cell phones such as… pic.twitter.com/xbgAXwZeAO
China has no law and regulations prohibiting the purchase and use of foreign brands of cell phones such as Apple.
Spokeswoman Mao Ning hosted a regular press conference. A reporter from TV Asahi of Japan asked: There are media reports that some Chinese government agencies have banned the use of Apple’s mobile phones. Is that true? Is it true that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also banned the use of Apple phones?
Mao Ning: China insists on promoting high-level opening up to the outside world, protecting the rights and interests of foreign investors in accordance with the law, and creating a market-oriented, rule-of-law environment. protect the rights and interests of foreign investors in accordance with the law, and create a first-class business environment that is market-oriented, based on the rule of law, and internationalized.
We have always held an open attitude towards foreign-funded enterprises. We welcome foreign enterprises to seize the opportunities of China’s development and share the fruits of China’s economic development. China has not issued a ban on the purchase and use of foreign brand cell phones such as Apple. There are no laws, regulations or policy documents in China that prohibit the purchase and use of foreign brands of cell phones, such as Apple.
However, we did notice recently that there were media reports about the purchase and use of foreign brands of cell phones such as Apple and noticed recently that there have been media reports of security incidents related to Apple phones.
The Chinese government attaches great importance to Internet and information and information security, and treats domestic and foreign enterprises equally. We hope that all mobile phone companies operating in China will be treated equally. We hope that all cell phone companies operating in China will strictly comply with the Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China. We hope that all mobile phone companies operating in China will strictly comply with the Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China and other laws and regulations. and the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Personal Information data stored in consumers’ mobile phones from being stolen by any individual or organization, and ensure information security. information security.
A Uk based Asylum Seeker namely, 'Avtar Singh Khanda' has been arrested for pulling down Indian Flag at Embassy in London. His father 'Kulwant Singh Khukrana' was a terrorist of the 'Khalistan Liberation Force'. pic.twitter.com/jFyU0XNWTz
Supposed aliens, mummified and shrunken, were presented before Mexico’s Congress. But scientists are voicing skepticism, saying details about the figures “made no sense,” AP reports. https://t.co/XRu5Io0gRn
after four decades of impressive growth, china's economy is at a turning point, thanks to⁰ -record high youth unemployment -manufacturing activity shrinking -declining exports -stalling foreign investments⁰ so what happens next?https://t.co/ilg1QKek8u
China’s economic woes, explained September 13, 2023 Ian Bremmer
. What happens next?
Now that the real estate boom has gone bust, China’s economy is unraveling under the weight of its contradictions.
Property prices are crashing. Household wealth is getting wiped out. Borrowers are defaulting on their mortgages, in turn leading developers and lenders to default. Credit is flatlining. Revenues for local governments are drying up at the same time as their debt servicing costs rise. Domestic demand is plummeting as all these economic actors hunker down and go into deleveraging mode, causing a growth slowdown.
In the past, Beijing would’ve responded by injecting debt-financed stimulus into the property sector. But that strategy has reached the end of its rope. Large-scale bailouts by the central government to distressed developers, shadow banks, and local governments are also off the table for now.
The obvious thing Beijing could do to stimulate growth in the short term would be to give direct fiscal stimulus to consumers (especially the poor and unemployed, who have the highest propensity to spend). Consumer stimulus would also be a step in the right direction toward the kind of structural reform China needs to achieve more balanced and sustainable growth in the long term: shifting economic activity from investment to household consumption, which at 38% of China’s GDP is extremely low compared to the 60% global average and about 70% in the US.
But Xi is ideologically suspicious of consumption, both as a policy lever and as a driver of so-called “high-quality development.” The concern is that stimulating consumption would either exacerbate the property/debt bubble or be ineffective as households use the money to repay debts or save rather than spend. More broadly, Xi fears that the redistribution of resources required to give households a larger share of the pie could generate social unrest and undermine his and the Chinese Communist Party’s political control. And if there’s one thing you should know about Xi, it’s that he prioritizes social stability and political control above all else – including economic growth.
This is the sort of policy bind that would pose an urgent political crisis in any democracy. But China is no democracy. After his extreme consolidation of power post-20th Party Congress, Xi has the unique political ability to ignore the slowdown if he so chooses. And that is exactly what he’ll do unless his hand is unexpectedly forced by systemic financial contagion or mass protests – at which point the response could be too little, too late. Which means Chinese growth is going to be slower for longer, with the bigger structural challenges remaining unaddressed for the foreseeable future.
To be clear, China remains a highly competitive economy, with enduring advantages in manufacturing, renewable energy, and electric vehicles as well as leading-edge innovation in frontier industries such as advanced computing, AI, biotechnology, and the like.
Yet outside these clusters and absent a more decisive rebalancing from Beijing, China’s economy could soon begin to look like Japan’s in the 1990s, which suffered a “lost decade” of prolonged deflation, stagnant growth, and high indebtedness on the back of a stock market and property crash. The difference being that this “Japanification” would hit China at a much lower level of development, long before it can close the gap in living standards with rich countries.
Could a chronically weaker economy chip away at China’s social contract, undermining popular support for Xi and the CCP and weakening their grip on power? Could it tank the global economy? Could it prompt Beijing to become more aggressive abroad, making a conflict with the US over Taiwan more likely or imminent?
I’ll tackle these questions in future newsletters.
weehingthong 